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INTRODUCTION: THE MEDIA WAR 
 
n December 2010, reporters around the world declared 
that Andhra Pradesh, the fifth largest state in India, was 
facing an unprecedented suicide epidemic. The alleged 
cause of the spike in suicides was malpractice on the 
parts of microfinance institutions (MFI). The media rapidly 
became saturated with stories of individuals whose excessive 
debt burdens were composed of multiple MFI loans, and 
whose deaths were prompted by the coercive practices of 
MFI employees. The accusations were explicit, as the New 
York Times, BBC News, and Bloomberg ran articles entitled 
“India Microcredit Faces Collapse from Defaults,” 1 
“India’s Micro-finance Suicide Epidemic,” 2 and “Suicides 
in India Revealing How Men Made a Mess of Microcredit.” 3 
By December 2010, the Society for Elimination of Rural 
Poverty (SERP), a governmental agency, reported at least 70 
MFI-related suicides.4 Hence, the financial service, which 
had once been hailed as the silver bullet against poverty, 
became the target of public and governmental outrage. Faith 
in microfinance deteriorated around the world as the deaths 
unfolded. 
 Yet the causes behind the MFI crash, measured by 
the high default rates that rendered these institutions 
unsustainable, remain unclear. Following the suicides, the 
government of Andhra Pradesh passed the Micro Finance 
Institutions Ordinance in October 2010, which substantially 
limited the growth and operation of MFIs in the state. 
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official who drafted the law, MFIs’ sole focus on making 
“hyperprofits off the poor” justified such regulations.5 
Subrahmanyam claimed that MFIs awarded loans to “rural 
people without checking whether they had the capacity to 
repay,” and thereby caused their own demise.6 
 However, as argued in this paper, the incompatibility 
of MFIs with the political system in Andhra Pradesh was the 
true driving force behind the crash. The portrayal of the crisis 
as entirely the fault of the MFIs prompted skepticism among 
microfinance scholars and practitioners regarding the role 
and culpability of the government itself. Elizabeth Rhyne, the 
Managing Director of the Center for Financial Inclusion, 
argues that the passage of the Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance 
Institutions Ordinance (2010) was based on the state 
government’s ulterior political motives. She suggests that the 
government capitalized on the increasing dissatisfaction with 
MFIs to suppress private competition with the government’s 
self-help group (SHG) programs. Therefore, the ordinance, 
not the farmer suicides, signaled the beginning of the MFI 
crash, as it impeded the operation of MFIs and increased 
banks’ reluctance to provide liquidity.7 
 The polarized media war between those who blame 
the MFIs and those who find fault with the government has 
raised several questions. Firstly, is for-profit microfinance, a 
model prevalent in rural Andhra Pradesh, inherently at odds 
with social development? Secondly, was the Andhra Pradesh 
Micro Finance Ordinance (2010) necessary? Finally, what 
are the impact and implications of the crisis on microfinance 
and development policies in Andhra Pradesh and around the 
world? 
 This paper aims to answer these questions through a 
discussion of the economic and political aspects of 
microfinance expansion in Andhra Pradesh. Superficially, the 
crash appears to be a manifestation of the controversy 
regarding best practices in poverty alleviation strategies. 
However, the story actually centers on the competition 
among various actors to gain political power through the 
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installation of development programs. The intense conflict 
between political parties and their struggle to gain votes 
through clientelism contributed to a politically tense 
environment. By providing a service that overlapped with 
those extended by the government, private MFIs interfered 
with political parties’ strategies to establish power and thus 
served as the perfect scapegoats to further each player’s 
ulterior agenda. Therefore, while financial motives may have 
encouraged MFI growth and misconduct, the threat that these 
organizations posed to Andhra Pradesh’s political system is 
the primary factor that precipitated the crisis.  
This article supports the thesis through a critique of 
the government’s fundamental arguments against profit-
seeking MFIs. The first section provides the historical 
background surrounding government regulation, particular in 
regard to development projects and the banking system. The 
paper then focuses on the relationship between the World 
Bank and the central government of India, and the effects of 
political competition on welfare and development programs 
in Andhra Pradesh. The final sections discuss the 
competition between the government and private actors, and 
analyze the factors that differentiate MFI outcomes in 
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. These comparative analyses 
reveal that the difference between the microfinance markets 
in Andhra Pradesh and those in other states and countries 
was not due to the MFIs’ operations but rather the political 
context in which these MFIs functioned.  
 
THE GOVERNMENT’S JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
ORDINANCE 
 
The primary purpose of microfinance in India is to 
provide a means through which impoverished families who 
are generally excluded from financial systems may access 
credit. Prior to the introduction of microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) in India in the 1980s, the poor predominantly relied 
on informal commercial lenders, as formal banks were 
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unwilling to provide credit to those who were insolvent or 
could provide no collateral.8 These moneylenders were easily 
accessible and unregulated, and were thus able to charge 
exorbitant interest rates.9 MFIs provided a seemingly 
preferable form of credit. Microcredit, as originally 
conceptualized by Muhammad Yunus, consists of small 
loans that primarily “support income-generating businesses 
aimed at lifting the poor out of poverty.”10 Most MFIs in 
India grant loans to individuals, though some encourage 
clients to form joint-liability groups (JLGs). The latter 
scheme allows members to guarantee each other’s loans.11 
The microfinance industry, composed of both government-
sponsored and private institutions, aimed to meet the poor’s 
unfulfilled demand for financial services and rapidly 
burgeoned, reaching a year-over-year growth rate of 7 to 8 
percent from 2005 onwards.12  
The microfinance which emerged in Andhra Pradesh 
significantly differed from that proposed by Muhammad 
Yunus. According to Yunus, MFIs should charge the 
minimum interest rates required to sustain functionality.13 
Unlike Yunus’ model, however, some Indian MFIs such as 
SKS Microfinance Limited sought profits. SKS was first 
founded in 1996 as a non-profit NGO. The organization 
rapidly grew with the financial support of Yunus’s Grameen 
Bank and ICICI, one of the largest banks in India. In an 
attempt to increase the growth rate of his MFI, Vikram Akula 
transformed SKS into a for-profit Non-banking Financial 
Company (NBFC), which enabled him to access to new and 
larger sources of funding through the banking sector.14 As a 
result, the institution’s branches, staff, and money disbursed 
increased more than ten-fold from 2007 to 2010.15 Thus, 
SKS received innumerable accolades and was ranked the 
number one MFI in India and the number two MFI in the 
world, according to MixMarket.16 SKS is merely one of 
many for-profit MFIs headquartered in Andhra Pradesh. 
What incited controversy among development 
experts was the extent to which MFIs in Andhra Pradesh 
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appeared to prioritize profits. In an attempt to further 
accelerate growth, SKS launched an initial public offering 
and raised over $350 million only four months before the 
crisis.17 This action garnered criticism from Akula’s former 
supporter and financier, Muhammad Yunus, who argued that 
this transformation would pressure the MFI to prioritize the 
interests of shareholders over the interests of clients. In 
catering to profit-seeking investors, SKS would, Yunus 
feared, support the prospect of “making money out of poor 
people.”18  
Indeed, both government officials and microfinance 
executives, including BASIX chairman Vijay Mahajan, agree 
that MFIs’ sole focus on this “quest to grow” compromised 
ethical standards and thereby contributed to the crisis.19 
Profit-driven expansion of services pushed MFIs into 
overlapping geographical regions. Due to the absence of a 
unified microfinance regulatory authority, complete data on 
the extent of this overlap are unavailable. Regardless, the 
Institute for Financial Management and Research (IFMR) 
has managed to construct a map of microfinance penetration 
in India based on limited data. According to IFMR, Andhra 
Pradesh has the highest MFI/SHG penetration of all of the 
states in India.20 Additionally, Sa-Dhan, an association of 
over 200 Community Development Finance Institutions 
(CDFIs), has generated a Microfinance Map of India based 
on the data reported by its members.21 Although the data are 
gross underestimates of MFIs’ true reach, as many do not 
regularly submit and monitor their finances, these maps 
provide important insights. For one, compared to other states 
in India, the MFI market in Andhra Pradesh is relatively 
saturated. 
Based on this broad conclusion and the anecdotes 
relayed through the media, the government publicly 
concluded that the geographic concentration of MFIs led to 
intense competition and inappropriate practices within the 
sector. According to Reddy Subrahmanyam, Principal 
Secretary of the Department of Rural Development in the 
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Andhra Pradesh Government, MFIs engaged in 
“irresponsible lending leading to multiple loans without due 
diligence, unproductive loans for consumption and consumer 
durables, lack of transparency in operations, usurious interest 
rates, and coercive recovery practices.”22 Prabhu Ghate, 
author of Microfinance in India: State of the Sector Report 
(2007), further asserts that in order to attract clients, many 
MFIs relaxed previously stringent deadlines and fines.23 
Taylor (2011) provides further descriptions of misconduct 
and asserts that MFIs additionally obscured the high interest 
rates that they would ultimately charge on the loan 
repayments.24 This prioritization of profits over social 
development appears to be supported by the finances of the 
MFIs—such institutions as SKS, BASIX, and Spandana 
charged interest rates as high as 30 per cent on loans, while 
they borrowed funds from banks at interest rates as low as 11 
per cent.25 
Due to the large number of MFIs, clients began to 
simultaneously take loans from multiple institutions, and 
often used one loan to repay another.26 Cases such as these 
were widely documented in the media, as households that 
engaged in such practices became saddled with 
insurmountable debts. MFIs essentially partook in subprime 
lending, as they primarily lent to marginal farmers who 
already faced extreme financial pressures. The clients were 
generally agrarian families who were susceptible to the 
financial stresses of irregular weather patterns and poorly 
developed infrastructure.27 This aggressive growth created a 
bubble in the microfinance industry that, according to the 
foresight of Ashish Lakhanpal, Managing Director of Kismet 
Capital LLC, and Monica Brand, Principal Director at 
Accion International, was bound to burst.28 
The government’s accusations against profit-seeking 
MFIs imply that for-profit microfinance is inherently 
doomed to fail. As asserted by Reddy Subrahmanyam, the 
MFIs’ focus on profits pushed them to award loans to “rural 
people without checking whether they had the capacity to 
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repay,” and thereby caused their own demise.29 These 
statements suggest that such profit driven microfinance is 
unsustainable and inconsistent with the ultimate goal of 
poverty alleviation. If the government’s argument were true, 
it would imply that similar MFI crises should be observed in 
for-profit dominated microfinance markets outside of India.  
Yet a closer analysis of the ordinance reveals that the 
government’s actions do not resemble the legal frameworks 
established in any other microfinance-rich region. The 
legislation unmistakably favors banks over MFIs, as it states 
“No MFI shall extend a further loan to a SHG or its 
members, where the SHG has an outstanding loan from a 
Bank unless the MFI obtains the prior approval in writing in 
such manner as may be prescribed from the Registering 
Authority after making an application seeking such 
approval”.30 The MFI Ordinance (2010) also contains 
stipulations that are overly punitive and seemingly arbitrary. 
For example, the legislation broadly defines coercive actions 
as: 
 (a) obstructing or using violence to, insulting or 
 intimidating the borrower or his family 
 members, or 
(b) persistently following the borrower or his family 
from place to place or interfering with any property 
owned or used by him or depriving him of, or 
hindering him in, the use of any such property 
(c) frequenting the house or other place where such 
other person resides or works, or carries on business, 
or happens to be, or 
(d) doing any act calculated to annoy or intimidate 
such person or the members of his  family, or 
(e) moving or acting in a manner which causes or is 
calculated to cause alarm or  danger to the person 
or property of such other person 
 (f) seeking to remove forcibly any document from 
 the borrower that entitles the borrower to a benefit 
 under any Government programme. 
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Complaints that fall within any of the categories above 
warrant prosecution of the MFI and such punishment often 
led to revocation of registration.31 Given the potential 
consequences of such complaints, points (d) and (e) above 
appear exceedingly biased toward the client, as any minor 
annoyance may legally justify court proceedings. The 
severity of the state government’s view of and actions toward 
the microfinance industry contrasts the cultivation and 
treatment of for-profit microfinance in other countries such 
as Bolivia in which the sector remained healthy.  
 
INDIA’S STATE-LED DEVELOPMENT AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON MFI EVOLUTION  
 
The power dynamic between these different actors in 
the years immediately following India’s independence 
provides the context for the government’s regulation of the 
financial sector. Given that the Indian government’s ability 
to drive industrial growth has long pivoted on its “power to 
define and pursue its goals.”32 India’s government has made 
frequent use of the banking sector to implement the country’s 
broader development strategies.33 Such was the case when 
the he government nationalized private banks in 1969 and 
1980. Although some private banks were permitted to exist, 
the rules governing their operations were stringent. 
Moreover, the state mandated that all public and private 
banks expand into rural regions, which were generally 
excluded from financial systems.34 The government further 
demanded that all banks allocate at least 40 per cent of their 
net credit to priority sectors, such as agriculture and other 
such underdeveloped sectors.35  
 The government attempted to further improve 
financial inclusion through the establishment of banks 
specified for this purpose. In 1976, for example, the Indian 
government established a system of regional rural banks 
(RRBs) with the intention of extending credit to the poor.36 
Furthermore, in 1981, the government created NABARD, a 
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development bank intended to “provide and regulate credit 
and other facilities for the promotion and development of 
agriculture, small scale industries, cottage and village 
industries, handicrafts and other rural crafts and other allied 
economic activities in rural areas with a view to promoting 
integrated rural development and securing prosperity of rural 
areas and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto”.37 According to Sa-Dhan, an association of MFIs, 
these attempts to meet the financial needs of the poor were 
insufficient. The main inefficiency of these government 
backed programs, particularly the Indian Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP), was the allocation of large subsidies to 
each participating family. The spending of these subsidies, 
essentially deemed loans handouts, were not closely 
monitored or supervised by the government and allowed for 
the misuse of the money received.38 Hence, such programs 
proved unsustainable, as they perpetuated dependence on the 
government, resulted in high bank losses, and resultantly 
came to be widely regarded as temporary rather than long-
term initiatives.39 
 It was precisely these conditions that prompted the 
introduction of MFIs in India. The demand for a secure and 
monitored credit scheme for the poor remained high in spite 
of the government’s attempts to address this neglected 
population while the priority sector lending (PSL) 
requirement pressured banks to find and extend loans to 
partnering service-providing organizations. As such, MFIs 
were convenient channels through which the PSL stipulation 
could be fulfilled.40 Thus, even such development banks as 
NABARD and Small Industries Development Bank of India 
(SIDBI) began lending to and encouraging the growth of 
MFIs as a way to reach larger segments of the poor 
population.41 The government’s initial financial support of 
MFIs is consistent with its early provision of subsidies and 
grants to capitalists for the sake of accelerated development.  
 The increasing diversification of MFI structures 
enabled each institution to occupy a different legal 
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classification. Although initially, MFIs were viewed solely as 
non-governmental development agencies and were registered 
as either societies and organizations “for the promotion of 
literature, science or the fine arts or the diffusion of useful 
knowledge/political education or for charitable purposes,” 
public or private trusts with defined members, or Section 25 
companies defined as “limited company[ies] for promoting 
commerce, art, science, religion, charity or any other useful 
object.42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 These classifications soon changed 
as the size of MFIs increased. With the growth of the MFIs, 
many legally transitioned from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to non-banking financial companies 
(NBFCs), in order to access bank credit, as in the case of 
SKS (Taylor, 2011). According to the Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) Act (1934), an NBFC is a “company…, which has as 
its principal business the receiving of deposits, under any 
scheme or arrangement in any other manner, or lending in 
any manner”.50 These companies are regulated by the 
nationalized RBI.51  
 The evolution of MFIs in this manner allowed them 
to commercialize and make the transition from non-profit to 
profit-seeking organizations though for many MFIs this 
transition remained incomplete. The RBI requirements for 
NBFC-MFIs can be difficult to fulfill including, in one 
example, required minimum net owned funds of Rs. 50 
million or roughly $1,000,000.52, 53 for an MFI to attain 
NBFC status.54, 55 Previously, in 1999, this particular 
requirement was less taxing though still unattainable for 
many MFIs, as the minimum net owned funds amounted to 
Rs. 20 million, or approximately $400,000.56 The MFIs’ 
inability to raise such funds may be partially attributed to 
RBI’s additional limitation that MFIs cannot accept deposits. 
The government’s strict rules, which are rooted in its long-
standing desire to control development and maintain power, 
have thereby pushed MFIs to seek profits as a means to 
ensure sustainability. 
In this fashion, he government’s interference with 
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MFI growth may have contributed to the Andhra Pradesh 
crisis. Even those MFIs registered as NBFCs cannot offer 
savings mechanisms, as the RBI explicitly defines an NBFC-
MFI as a “non-deposit taking NBFC”.57 These limitations 
reveal that Yunus’s denunciation of for-profit MFIs in India 
should be redirected toward the government. Yunus argues 
that the primary alternative to the for-profit structure is the 
acceptance of deposits. He contends that savings programs 
for the poor are currently unavailable, are in high demand, 
and may provide the capital required for the proper 
functioning of financial institutions.58 Yet MFIs in India, 
through no fault of their own, are legally prohibited from 
restructuring their programs in this manner. Due to the 
restrictions imposed by the government, even NBFCs that 
gain access to bank credit may be forced to resort to high 
interest rates in order to sustain function. The Indian 
government’s regulations stand in stark contrast to the 
microfinance industry in Latin America, as many for-profit 
MFIs in such countries as Bolivia and Mexico are authorized 
to not only provide loans but also savings mechanisms.59  
The state’s attempts to regulate the industry through 
the Andhra Pradesh MFI Ordinance (2010) are consistent 
with the nation’s interference with all development 
programs. It seems that India’s history of heavy regulation 
not only encouraged profit-seeking behavior, but also 
established precedence for the government of Andhra 
Pradesh to enact a heavily biased and harsh mandate. 
 
WELFARE POLITICS IN ANDHRA PRADESH 
 
  Although the government’s history of strictly 
regulating development explains why the microfinance 
market in India was vulnerable to crisis, it does not wholly 
elucidate why the crash specifically and so catastrophically 
occurred in Andhra Pradesh. Indeed, he severity of the 
restrictions on MFIs and the government’s apparent 
favoritism of MFI clients may only be fully explained by the 
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competition among national and state level political interests. 
In 1982, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) emerged in 
Andhra Pradesh politics with the primary purpose of 
challenging the Congress Party. The Congress Party’s 
constituency in each state of India differed depending on the 
local divisions. For example, “in Tamil Nadu conflict divided 
Brahmin and non-Brahmin, while in Rajasthan it was Rajput 
versus Jat, and in Andhra Pradesh the Kamma against 
the.Reddy],” though the Reddy and Kamma castes comprised 
only 6.5 and 4.8 percent of the state’s population 
respectively.60, 61 The Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh was 
largely composed of Reddys and relied on the support of the 
backward castes, a diverse group of communities. Members 
of the latter cohort ranged from small farmers to washer men 
to landless laborers.62 The TDP was founded on the basis of 
caste rivalries and economic discontents against the Congress 
Party’s supporters. The Kammas, who had largely improved 
their economic status through assorted entrepreneurial 
activities and commercial activities, were eager to challenge 
the political legacy of the Reddys and increase their own 
power.63 Therefore, they supported N. T. Rama Rao (NTR), 
the Kamma film star who founded TDP.  
The politics of Andhra Pradesh, like the national 
politics, were largely governed by the concerns associated 
with the fragmented-multiclass state. NTR’s support base 
was heterogeneous, as he attempted not only to appeal to 
Kammas, who occupied a range of economic classes, but also 
the rural poor, women, and the “backward” castes.6465which 
had traditionally served as the base of Congress Party’s 
traditional supporters. These factions were unified 
predominantly by dissatisfaction with the perceived 
corruption and inefficient practices of the Congress as well 
as their admiration of NTR’s apparent dynamism. Due to the 
diversity of the constituents, NTR’s promises ranged from 
economically and politically reforming the corrupt 
government to demanding increased state autonomy and 
implementing welfare programs to provide basic living needs 
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for the poor.66 The TDP thus became a party caught 
somewhere in between development-oriented and populist 
policies.  
 The TDP entered a second distinct stage under the 
leadership of NTR’s son-in-law Chandrababu Naidu. Naidu 
ousted NTR from the party in 1995 after his father-in-law’s 
command of the party proved too autocratic. He, too, drew 
support from a diverse base (Suri, 2004). Hence, Naidu’s 
rhetoric was carefully calculated to appeal to “the world 
outside AP, the urban middle classes, his own Members of 
the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), his rural party workers 
and the electorate”.67  
However, the TDP’s actual policies substantially 
differed from those proposed in its campaign platforms, due 
to the heterogeneity of its political constituency. Naidu was 
widely viewed as pragmatic relative to NTR, particularly in 
his apparent prioritization of development over populism. 
Specifically, he emphasized the need for fiscal austerity and 
a resistance towards implementing welfare programs the 
entire spectrum of proposed, citing the increasing need to 
balance the state’s budget as the top priority. He thereby 
gained the support of the higher socioeconomic classes who 
grew increasingly dissatisfied with NTR’s populist policies.68 
Yet socioeconomically and ethnically divided societies 
provide an environment conducive to clientelism (Medina & 
Stokes, 2002). According to Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2011), “clientelism refers to strategic transfers made by 
political parties and governments to poor and disadvantaged 
groups as a means of securing their votes, in an effort to 
consolidate political power”.69 Indeed, in order to maintain 
support among all socioeconomic classes, Naidu tempered 
his promises of true development with new welfare policies 
such as “India’s largest public housing program, a 
widespread consumption subsidy on rice, cut-rate power 
provision, and even free clothing”.70  
The dichotomy between development and welfare 
populism in Naidu’s policies may therefore be viewed in two 
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lights. Naidu may have either genuinely planned his 
development strategy to gradually phase out the 
government’s history of handouts and/or may have 
intentionally engaged in clientelism. Much of the rationale 
for clientelism arises from the large agrarian population. 
Aside from the socioeconomic and caste based divisions, 
factionalism also exists between urban and rural populations. 
It is also important to note that Naidu was often hailed as a 
leader of technology, in part because he supported the 
booming Information Technology sector. While this earned 
him praise, it also raised alarm among rural populations, who 
feared he focused too heavily on urban development.71 This 
rural discontent certainly concerned the TDP, as 67 per cent 
of the state’s population (and voters) resides in rural regions 
of the state.72 With this in mind, Naidu was forced to 
consider the desires of the agrarian cohort. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that the announcement and 
implementation of welfare programs coincided with election 
seasons.73  
While these rural communities’ distress was 
seemingly caused by apolitical factors, farmers often blamed 
the government’s inadequate attention for their woes. 
Although Andhra Pradesh is a drought-prone state, the large 
population of farmers relies on rainwater for profitable crop 
yields. This dependence on natural processes increases the 
agrarian populace’s vulnerability to extreme financial stress. 
As Cole, Healy, and Werker (2010) find, voters in India hold 
the incumbent party responsible for weather crises such as 
droughts.74 The severity of this negative response declines as 
the party’s relief expenditures increase only in the season 
preceding the election.75 The effects of financial stress on the 
rural population’s vote explains the increase in promises of 
welfare schemes prior to elections, and the trend that voters 
in Andhra Pradesh “express allegiance along party lines due 
both to an ideological commitment to parties and to the 
political biases in benefit allocations”.76 In 2004, for 
example, the coincidence of a drought and a resultant 
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exponential increase in farmer suicides with local elections 
harmed the TDP, as it resulted in a significant farmer vote 
against the party.77, 78 The distress and blame apportioned by 
farmers thus promoted clientelism as political parties 
attempted to buy their favor. 
Despite his clientelist tactics, Naidu earned his state 
the reputation as the poster child for economic and political 
reform during his reign as President of TDP and Chief 
Minister of Andhra Pradesh from 1995-2004. This is largely 
due to his focus on heavily publicizing his efforts to develop 
the state.79 The Chief Minister’s evident resolve and 
enthusiasm for reform, particularly with regards to 
technology, market-led processes, and the transition from 
welfare to true development, apparently impressed the 
Bank.80 Thus, Andhra Pradesh gained worldwide 
recognition. 
The TDP’s gradual transition away from populist 
policies at the encouragement of the World Bank left a power 
void that was quickly filled by the Congress Party. 
According to Medina & Stokes (2002), clientelism is based 
on one party’s political monopoly over a particular good that 
may “reduce the risk entailed in variations in income from 
private sources”.81Even while welfare programs initially 
proposed and implemented by the TDP are consistent with 
this definition as the TDP drifted away from populism and 
emphasized development policies it gradually released its 
grip on political monopoly and even unintentionally 
facilitated the rise of the Indian Congress Party. Against the 
wishes of the Bank, the ruling Congress Party insisted that 
free power be supplied to farmers following the drought in 
2006.82 Hence, this political party earned itself distinction as 
the party of the poor, with a political its clientelism that was 
largely mistaken for pro-poor policies.83 The local political 
parties’ quest for increased political power necessitated the 
installment of welfare programs alongside development 
initiatives and created a politically tense environment on 
which national and international spotlight focused. 
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SELF-HELP GROUPS 
 
 One of the primary development projects funded by 
the World Bank is the Self-Help Group (SHG) model, an 
alternative to microfinance. The governance of SHGs is 
separated into multiple tiers.84 The SHG itself is generally 
composed of 10-15 “women whose primary purpose is to 
save and then to take loans, initially from their own funds but 
eventually from a bank”.85 The group as a whole must repay 
the loan.86 The emphasis of the SHG model is group savings. 
This contrasts the standard microfinance institution (MFI) 
model of individual or join-liability loans.87  
 The dominance of SHGs over other models of 
microfinance was in part facilitated by the SHG-Bank 
Linkage Programme, organized by the National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) in 1992.88 
After witnessing the success of early SHGs, NABARD 
began to offer loans to SHGs of a maximum of four times the 
group’s savings.89 Today, several models of the SHG-Bank 
Linkage exist. The main benefit of the SHG-Bank Linkage is 
to reduce the risk associated with lending to the poor. 
Information regarding credit and repayment scores is 
unavailable for the target cohort. This lack of data may be 
mitigated through SHGs, as peers select and pressure 
members of the group to engage in responsible practices and 
follow repayment schedules.90 The SHG-Bank Linkage 
minimizes the transaction costs incurred by SHGs or small 
NGOs as well, as these organizations often do not have 
sufficient capital to absorb losses.91 
 Yet the rapid proliferation of the SHG model cannot 
be attributed to purely economic factors. Rather, the primary 
driver of its growth was the government’s adoption of the 
movement. By March 2002, ten years after the initiation of 
the program, the government funded over 50 per cent of 
460,000 SHGs.92 As Chakrabarti and Ravi (2011) suggest, 
the SHG has become the preferred mode of MFI delivery due 
to its favored status, not merely because it was the first 
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model introduced in the state.93 Major developments in the 
government’s support for SHGs occurred under the Naidu 
administration, in large part due to the TDP’s need to retain 
the support of rural cohorts. In the mid-1990s, the 
government supported the program for the Development of 
Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA), which 
largely focused on the establishment of SHGs.94 In 2000, 
Velugu, funded by a $111 million grant from the World 
Bank, was launched to supplement existing SHG efforts.95 
The Velugu program not only functions to provide loans to 
SHGs, but also assists these groups in the formation of 
cooperatives which may effectively negotiate prices of any 
goods produced. Additionally, the SHGs are used as conduits 
through which advice on investments and savings as well as 
other developmental objectives such as education and child 
marriage is disseminated.96 Velugu was later incorporated 
with District Rural Development Agencies (DRDA) to form 
Indira Kranthi Patham (IKP), a unified and more 
comprehensive agency targeting rural poverty.97 These 
projects channeled resources specifically toward the rural 
constituency. 
Given the symbiotic relationship between the World 
Bank and the government of Andhra Pradesh, the state’s 
apparent prioritization of SHGs over other development or 
poverty alleviation policies and models is understandable. 
The government’s priority remained to uphold its status as 
the poster child of reform and poverty alleviation, and 
maintain the support of rural voters. 
 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN ANDHRA 
PRADESH 
 
While the previous sections provide the context for 
the microfinance crisis, they do not answer why the MFI 
crisis specifically occurred in Andhra Pradesh over any other 
Indian state. The laws and regulations delineated operated at 
the national level, and thus created an environment that 
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encouraged the growth of for-profit microfinance throughout 
the country. However, the true origins of the crash lie in the 
unique events and policies in Andhra Pradesh that forced 
MFIs and other financial institutions to become increasingly 
interdependent and profit-seeking. 
The Krishna Crisis of 2005-2006 
 In 2005-2006, Andhra Pradesh witnessed a 
microfinance crisis similar in structure but smaller in scale to 
the crash of 2010. The Krishna Crisis, named because of its 
occurrence in the Krishna District of Andhra Pradesh, 
allegedly precipitated from MFI misconduct. MFIs, including 
BASIX and SHARE that were also implicated in the crisis in 
2010, purportedly engaged unaggressive expansion and loan 
recovery methods such as the use of intimidating and abusive 
language. According to local reports, these practices resulted 
in the suicides of 10 MFI clients who had defaulted. 
Additionally, MFIs were accused of charging “usurious 
interest rates,” further indebting the poor.98 Therefore, the 
government shut down fifty MFI branches, apparently in an 
attempt to end these exploitative practices.99 These actions 
resemble the government’s effective shutdown of the 
industry in 2010. 
During the Krishna Crisis, the state government’s 
condemnation of MFIs masked the political dimension of 
their actions. The MFIs’ inability to accept deposits 
inextricably linked the institutions with commercial banks 
for the sake of ensuring sufficient liquidity. In order to 
balance the interest rates charged on these bank loans, MFIs 
were forced to charge their clients high interest rates. Lower 
interest rates would have rendered these institutions 
unsustainable.100 Although MFIs attempted to compromise 
with the government by formulating a Code of Conduct 
through the Sa-Dhan association and proposed lowering 
interest rates past sustainable levels, the state still pursued 
drastic action in raiding and temporarily terminating the 
branches in the region.101 The government’s actions, 
therefore, suggest ulterior motives. 
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 The state government’s dissolution of the 
microfinance branches lies primarily in the competition 
between state-funded SHGs and private MFIs. According to 
a survey conducted in Guntur, a district along the coast of 
Andhra Pradesh, 67 per cent of all Velugu and MFI members 
were clients of both institutions.102 As Ghate reports, 
“government representatives [claimed] that the MFIs were 
‘eating into the SHG movement’”.103 A survey of Spandana 
clients showed that MFIs’ competitive edge derived from 
SHG members’ dissatisfaction with the relatively long loan 
waiting periods and small loan sizes offered through 
Velugu.104 Thus, MFIs posed a realistic challenge to the 
uptake of SHGs. 
Given the rampant national and international 
promotion of Velugu, the government apparently found the 
competition posed by MFIs unacceptable. This hostility may 
be attributed to the threat MFIs posed to the ruling party’s 
political power. SHGs may be viewed as a “risk-free 
activity…that helps voters to diversify their risk in an 
uncertain economic environment….and] reduces fluctuations 
in private income”.105 In this framework, the government 
may have used SHGs as clientelist goods. This 
conceptualization of SHGs relies on the state’s monopoly 
over the good. According to Medina & Stokes (2002), “the 
patron’s control over such an activity allows him to offer 
voters exclusive-dealing contracts”.106 The introduction of 
microfinance challenged this political monopoly, as MFIs 
offered similar and competitive services and thereby reduced 
the state’s full control of SHGs and its ability to use these 
programs as a means to gain power.  
 The impact of the Krishna Crisis on the growth and 
function of MFIs was limited. In response to the demand for 
regulation, the Micro Financial Sector (Development and 
Regulation) Bill was introduced into Parliament in 2007. 
This bill called for the formation of a Micro Finance 
Development Council to advise NABARD, the chosen 
regulator for all MFIs, on financial policy. Furthermore, the 
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bill proposed a Micro Finance Development and Equity Fund 
to facilitate further development of microfinance. The 
proposed legislation spurred controversy and was opposed by 
feminists and agrarian activists. They complained that the 
bill allowed the government to evade its responsibility of 
increasing financial inclusion through a fundamental 
restructuring of the system by encouraging private MFI 
function and growth.107 Others charged that commercial 
banks and accountability structures, among other necessities, 
were not adequately discussed in the bill. These critics 
ultimately prevented the passage of the legislation. Hence, 
the only weakly positive outcome of the crisis was Sa-
Dhan’s Code of Conduct, a voluntary set of regulations that 
members of the association promised to adhere to. This code 
did not legally increase accountability. 
 
REGULATION AS A MEANS TO SUPPRESS 
COMPETITION 
 
 The dynamics between the MFIs and state 
government during the Krishna Crisis mirror those observed 
in the state-wide crisis in 2010. MFIs became increasingly 
involved as intermediaries in the SHG-Bank Linkage. 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of MFIs into regions 
already saturated with state-funded SHGs associated with 
Velugu enabled clients to take multiple loans from different 
institutions.108 According to M-CRIL, a microfinance rating 
organization, “in 2007, state-backed self-help 
groups…sometimes at subsidized interest rates, added 8.5 
million clients, while microfinance groups added 3.2 million. 
Two years later, self-help groups added just 6.7 million 
clients, while microfinance groups added 8.5 million”.109 The 
success of MFIs at the cost of SHGs once again threatened 
Andhra Pradesh’s status as the “unquestioned leader in the 
sector”.110 In fact, according to a study conducted by World 
Bank researchers, “marginal farmers exhibited a slightly 
higher preference for SHG loans than small and large 
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farmers but they ended up borrowing the least from this 
source (less than 10 percent of households),” indicating that 
for the most part, MFIs were more popular than SHGs.111 
 The state government thus acted to inflict damage 
upon the microfinance industry in order to reduce such 
competition. The government passed the Andhra Pradesh 
Micro Finance Ordinance, which essentially terminated a 
substantial proportion of microfinance activity,,, mandated 
that all existing loans in violation of the terms of the 
ordinance must be refunded to the clients and included 
provisions which substantially retarded growth, such as the 
need for prior approval before the provision of loans to SHG 
members.112 The ordinance did not require any changes to 
the SHG programs, showing clear bias. The state recently 
enacted additional regulations for NBFC-MFIs, including 
strict limitations on the size of the institution’s loans to Rs. 
50,000 or approximately $1,000. Loans greater than Rs. 
15,000 or $300 are required to have a tenure of at least two 
years.113 Due to the saturation of SHGs throughout the state 
and large client base, MFIs were forced to give up a 
substantial number of clients who also partook in SHGs. 
Thus, these MFIs faced enormous losses. For example, the 
Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) of Spandana decreased by more 
than 30 per cent in the year following the crash. The GLP of 
SKS Microfinance Limited decreased by 75 per cent during 
the same period.114 The state was able to use its power to 
punish the MFIs and thereby diminish their competitiveness 
in the market. 
 These losses were likely exacerbated by the actions 
of the opposition party, the TDP. Specifically, Naidu blasted 
the government for not having instituted a regulatory 
authority to control the exploitative practices of MFIs, and 
insinuated that the government was permitting the MFIs to 
enjoy free reign.115 He also demanded that the government 
fulfill its promise to help women gain access to loans directly 
from banks at an interest rate of only three per cent, and 
called for the elimination of the SHG-MFI-Bank linkage. As 
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TDP struggled to rebuild its support base, Chandrababu 
Naidu urged MFI clients not to repay their loans. On the one 
hand, the TDP founded the Velugu project and likely had a 
vested interest in its success. On the other, Naidu 
manipulated the complaints against MFIs to criticize the 
government and praise his own party. Naidu juxtaposed such 
criticisms with an image of a pro-poor TDP. At a public 
meeting, for example, he stated “If MFI agents harass you for 
repayment, tie them up in a room and call the TDP workers 
for support”.116  
 The two parties’ rhetoric reveals that both aimed to 
promote their respective political standings under the guise 
of welfare. As suggested by Taylor (2011), “the [Congress 
Party’s] actions were an attempt to use MFIs as a scapegoat 
for rural distress, not least because the expansive growth of 
MFIs was seen as a competitor to the state’s SHG 
programme”.117 The government likely wished to eliminate 
any factors that would have tainted Andhra Pradesh’s 
aggressively promoted and glorified image as the pioneer of 
development. The TDP similarly seemed to blame any trends 
that indicated slowed development or agrarian 
disillusionment on the Congress Party and MFIs, and portray 
itself as the true party of the economically disadvantaged and 
rural classes.  
 Yet rural distress has long existed in Andhra Pradesh, 
and does, in fact, indicate certain governmental failures. 
Hundreds of farmer suicides have been reported over the 
twenty years preceding the crisis in Andhra Pradesh. One of 
the first recorded spikes in such deaths occurred in 1987, 
when cotton farmers committed suicide due to crop losses 
and resultant financial burdens.118 Since then, farmer suicides 
have become a widespread problem in Andhra Pradesh. This 
history of farmer suicides suggests that the government’s 
neglect to focus on true development efforts may be at least 
partially at fault. Instead of providing handouts, the 
government could have theoretically protected farmers 
against price volatility or restructured and improved the 
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financial services available to this population.  
It is likely that the government feared the 
implications of the highly publicized rural distress. This fear 
may have stemmed from the suicide epidemic that began in 
1997 in Telangana. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in 
opposition to Naidu’s TDP, accused the government of 
failing to “provide extension services, to supervise quality 
control of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs” due 
to the TDP’s emphasis on reforms over welfare.119 The BJP 
also suggested that the government’s response to the suicide 
epidemic was insufficient.120 The resultant negative publicity 
may have not only cost the TDP votes, but also weakened its 
image as a proponent of development. 
Thus, MFIs served as a convenient scapegoat to 
divert the blame for farmer suicides away from the 
government. As stated earlier, the Society for Elimination of 
Rural Poverty (SERP) reported at least 54 “microfinance-
related” deaths by October 2010. However, nowhere on its 
website does it define the term “microfinance-related.” The 
SERP’s full report, which includes descriptions of these 
deaths, was published online by Microfinance Focus, a 
microfinance news agency. Among these descriptions was 
one of a woman who “committed suicide by consuming 
pesticide. She is a SHG Member” who held both SHG and 
MFI loans.121 The report also includes such brief statements 
as “Rs 57000 was given as loan and committed suicide”.122 
This description, similar to many others recorded, does not 
even attempt to establish causation. SERP also described 
farmers who allegedly committed suicide due to harassment 
by MFI officers.123 Yet the causes of death were often 
reported by family members of the deceased individual, and 
thus may have been shaped by the government’s rhetoric of 
microfinance criminality. Therefore, the government’s 
conclusion that the misconduct of MFIs was to blame for the 
spike in farmer suicides seems specious.  
 The government’s actions were consistent with the 
Congress Party’s previous efforts to gain the political support 
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of the rural population. The state’s history of providing 
unsustainable handouts to the poor condoned these 
politicians’ harsh and rash statements and actions without 
raising questions. After the 2004 election in which the TDP 
was defeated, the Congress Party instituted the welfare 
schemes it had promised in its campaigns. One of these 
promises was a declared “moratorium…on the recovery of 
farm debts”.124 This essentially converted loans into grants. 
Similarly, during the crisis in 2006, the government 
convinced borrowers that MFIs were criminal and 
encouraged them to not repay their MFI loans. Rather, the 
government would absorb the loans and lower their interest 
rates.125 The state government supported SHGs through 
pavala vaddi, a performance-based subsidy of up to 75 per 
cent of the interest that the linked banks charged on their 
loans. The cumulative cost of this program from 2006-7 was 
approximately $15 million.126 The initiative seems 
unsustainable, as the government essentially provides nearly 
interest free loans by paying for the banks’ transaction costs. 
This well-established trend in state-sponsored programs 
permitted politicians to implore clients to refuse repayment 
and thereby transform MFI loans into handouts during the 
MFI crisis of 2010, despite the fact that the funds were 
derived from private entities rather than the government.  
 The political structure of India’s banking system also 
exacerbated the crisis. The financial link between MFIs and 
banks begs the question of why the banks did not speak 
against the government’s clearly biased actions. The MFIs’ 
losses resulting from the legislation and defaults encouraged 
by politicians would have certainly resulted in bank losses. 
However, approximately 83 per cent of all banking in India 
is controlled by the government or nationalized banks. Even 
those banks that are not nationalized must comply with the 
state’s strict regulations.127 The tight relationship between the 
banks and the government likely rendered protest against the 
new legislation politically risky. Had the banks challenged 
the government’s actions, the government could have easily 
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retaliated and imposed further restrictions on bank 
operations. Therefore, the unique image of Andhra Pradesh 
as the archetype of development, the government’s history of 
interference with the private sector and the extreme political 
competition between parties created a political environment 
hostile to MFIs. 
 
CONTAINMENT OF CONTAGION: MICROFINANCE 
IN KARNATAKA 
 
This discussion of the evolution of MFIs and 
subsequent crisis in Andhra Pradesh suggests that political 
factors were involved in the failure of microfinance in the 
state. However, whether politics was the driving force behind 
the crash may be further informed by the comparative 
analysis of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh as opposed to its 
neighboring state, Karnataka. After the crisis in October 
2010, questions emerged of about whether defaults would 
rise and the crash would spread throughout the states 
surrounding Andhra Pradesh. As posited by Shankar and 
Asher (2010), “the interdependencies between group 
members in microfinance can lead to a different kind of 
contagion effect. Widespread defaults can occur either if 
some members start consistently defaulting or if there are 
rumours of MFI failures”.128 In other words, reports of MFI 
failures in Andhra Pradesh may have encouraged defaults in 
adjacent regions. Yet no evidence of an MFI crisis in 
Karnataka following that in Andhra Pradesh has been 
reported. This section aims to elucidate the differences 
between MFI operations in the two states.  
The demographic, economic, and environmental 
descriptors of the neighboring states of Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh are comparable. While the total population 
of Karnataka is roughly 60 million, that of Andhra Pradesh is 
roughly 70 million. The rural populations of both states are 
over sixty percent. The literacy rates of Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh are approximately 76 percent and 68 per 
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cent, respectively.129 130 Both states experience similar 
climates and are drought and flood prone.131 Moreover, the 
estimated MFI penetration in both states is similar, at 
approximately 5.3 percent in Karnataka and 7.0 percent in 
Andhra Pradesh.132 The aggregate growth rates of MFIs and 
SHGs over the period 2007-2010 were also comparable, at 
129.1 percent and 126.5 percent for Karnataka and Andhra 
Pradesh, respectively.133 
Despite these similarities, the political systems of 
both states significantly differ. In Andhra Pradesh, politics 
are relatively volatile, characterized by the struggle between 
the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and its primary opponent, the 
Congress Party, to win control of the government. The 
constituencies of these two parties are largely divided based 
on caste and socioeconomic status. In contrast, one party – 
the Congress Party, has generally dominated Karnataka’s 
state government. This political party relies on the joint 
support of both the dominant and weaker castes and ethnic 
groups.134 As a result, the governance of Karnataka appears 
far more unified, stable, and rational than that of Andhra 
Pradesh. Even when the opposition parties, the Janata Party 
and the Janata Dal, won control of the state government for 
short periods of time their constituents and ideologies did not 
dramatically deviate from those of the Congress Party.135  
 Given the economic similarities between Karnataka 
and Andhra Pradesh and the higher continuity of government 
in Karnataka, the World Bank’s decision to focus on and 
publicize the development of Andhra Pradesh seems 
counterintuitive. The Bank’s preference for Andhra Pradesh 
seems primarily based on its own political agenda. This 
objective stems from the Bank’s inability to establish a 
strong foothold in Indian politics. Unlike other recipient 
countries, India retained a high level of autonomy from the 
World Bank with regards to policy design.136 The only 
manner in which the World Bank could push its agenda of 
liberalization and market efficiency was through state-based 
initiatives. Unlike in Andhra Pradesh, where the TDP allied 
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with the parties dominating the central government, the 
dominant Congress Party in Karnataka provided fewer 
opportunities for the Bank to increase its influence 
throughout the nation.137 Winning favor with Karnataka 
would not help the World Bank build a stronger presence in 
India. Moreover, Naidu’s dynamic personality and eager 
dialogue with the World Bank stood in stark contrast to J. H. 
Patel, Karnataka’s Chief Minister from 1996-1999, who 
appeared more hesitant to deal with the external agent. 
Hence, the Bank committed substantially higher funds to 
Andhra Pradesh than it did to its neighboring state.138 
Thus, Karnataka was able to focus on independently 
designed reforms. The World Bank had a relatively lower 
stake in its relationship with Karnataka and did not condone 
populist schemes as it had in Andhra Pradesh. Therefore, 
while the Bank inadvertently supported the legacy of welfare 
politics in Andhra Pradesh, it applied harsher standards of 
development toward Karnataka encouraged more legitimate 
economic reforms. Finally, because the policies pursued in 
Karnataka were not as widely publicized as those in Andhra 
Pradesh, the World Bank allowed the state to retain more 
autonomy in the ultimate design and implementation of 
reforms.139 The Bank’s comparatively low and discreet 
presence in Karnataka meant that the state’s government 
remained unfettered by any significant international image. 
Additionally, Karnataka may be conceptualized as a 
cohesive multiclass state.140 Although the government’s 
political power derives from support across socioeconomic 
classes and castes, the convergence of their political interests 
allows social cohesion. Because of this relative unity, the 
Congress Party in Karnataka, unlike the parties in Andhra 
Pradesh, does not experience pressure to deploy welfare 
programs as a means to win votes. The Congress Party 
already enjoys general political monopoly and has no need to 
engage in competition with MFIs. In contrast, Andhra 
Pradesh is a fragmented multi-party state and as a result has a 
complex relationship with the private sector that is 
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“sometimes cooperative but just as often conflictual.”141  
 Accordingly, the relationship between MFIs and the 
government of Karnataka appears cordial, in contrast to the 
situation in Andhra Pradesh. This accordance does not 
suggest that the microfinance sector in Karnataka has always 
been highly regarded. According to Samit Ghosh, founder of 
the MFI Ujjivan Financial Services, the key factor that 
facilitated the success of MFIs in Karnataka was their ability 
to “[learn] from the setbacks in Ramanagaram and Kolar 
districts in 2009,” where credit bubbles burst.142 This is 
exhibited through the studies voluntarily conducted by the 
Association of Karnataka Microfinance Institutions (AKMI) 
immediately after the mini-crises.143 One of the primary 
objectives of AKMI is to represent its members and engage 
in policy discussions with the government. As such, the 
association has repeatedly cooperated with the state 
government and organized meetings regarding the best 
practices in loan provision.144  
This collaboration may be partly attributed to the fact 
that the SHG movement in Karnataka was not as strong as 
the government-funded scheme in Andhra Pradesh. While 
the combined MFI and SHG penetration in Andhra Pradesh 
appears to exceed that of Karnataka, a large number of 
districts in Karnataka exhibit a higher MFI penetration than 
the districts of Andhra Pradesh.145 This pattern suggests that 
although the combined MFI and SHG growth rates are more 
or less equivalent across both states, Karnataka’s market was 
dominated by an expansion of MFIs while that of Andhra 
Pradesh was dominated by an expansion of SHGs. Over the 
period 2007-2010, the estimated MFI growth rate in 
Karnataka (approximately 61 per cent) significantly 
exceeded that of Andhra Pradesh (roughly 45 percent).146 
The government’s emphasis on SHG growth in Andhra 
Pradesh is therefore apparent. 
 The cooperative relationship between MFIs and the 
state appears opposite to the competition that precipitated the 
crisis in Andhra Pradesh. According to Palekar (2007), “the 
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state leadership [of Karnataka] has always desired to resolve 
disputes through peaceful means rather than through the path 
of confrontation.”147 Indeed, the government did not pursue 
any drastic action following the local microcredit bubbles 
that formed in southern Karnataka, and instead permitted the 
MFIs to investigate the crises themselves. This contrasts the 
government of Andhra Pradesh’s response to the Krishna 
Crisis in 2005-2006. Perhaps as a result of the cooperation 
between the government and MFIs in Karnataka, after the 
local crises, AKMI drafted a Code of Conduct to which the 
members actually adhered.148 Therefore, in Karnataka, 
although MFIs faced similar growth challenges to those 
experienced in Andhra Pradesh, microfinance was 
compatible with the political system of the state. 
 In contrast, the hostility between the government and 
MFIs in Andhra Pradesh may have contributed to the MFIs’ 
lack of adherence to the Sa-Dhan Code of Conduct, similarly 
written after the Krishna Crisis. The MFIs were not only 
competing with each other, but also with the government’s 
SHGs. Thus, no true change in the practices of MFIs 
occurred after the crash. The fact that the state of Andhra 
Pradesh did not step in to restructure the rural financial 
systems suggests that the economic arguments and 
accusations against these institutions were not truly as salient 
as the political objectives of the government. The similarities 
between the Krishna Crisis of 2006 and the state-wide crises 
in 2010 imply that the latter could have been avoided through 
increased regulation. It seems, however, that the government 
of Andhra Pradesh was more preoccupied with completely 
shutting down microfinance than cooperatively addressing 
the economic challenges the industry faced. Therefore, in 
Andhra Pradesh, microfinance was incompatible with the 
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS AND THE WAY 
FORWARD 
 
 The microfinance crisis in Andhra Pradesh was a 
pivotal moment in the history of development assistance and 
poverty alleviation strategies. The apparent misconduct of 
for-profit microfinance institutions (MFIs) raised 
fundamental questions regarding the possibility of mission 
drift away from the original social motives to profit-driven 
growth. However, as shown through this paper, the events 
leading up to and following the crisis cannot be isolated as 
purely economic or exogenous processes. The main 
characteristic of Andhra Pradesh’s microfinance market that 
distinguished it from those around the world and triggered 
the crash was the political system in which it was embedded. 
Specifically, various political actors competed for control of 
development policies in attempt to augment their own power 
and influence within the state, nation, and world. 
  The manifestation of the power struggle in the 
microfinance industry may be traced to the classification of 
India and Andhra Pradesh as fragmented multi-class states.149 
In such a developing state, political parties at the national 
and state level must design sufficiently broad agendas and 
policies to elicit political support across the country’s 
innumerable ethnic and socioeconomic factions. This 
requirement has resulted in dualistic policies, whereby 
political leaders simultaneously establish populist programs 
and development or reform initiatives.150  
The poverty and divisions prevalent throughout India 
increased the vulnerability of its political structure to 
clientelism.151 In Andhra Pradesh, state-sponsored welfare 
schemes and self-help groups (SHGs) may be conceptualized 
as clientelist programs that political parties have constructed 
to gain the rural vote. Yet the success of clientelism depends 
on the patron’s monopoly over the good provisioned.152 The 
intense competition between political parties in Andhra 
Pradesh is evidence of this conceptualization, as the 
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Congress Party and Telugu Desam Party have actively 
attempted to undermine their rivals’ ownership of welfare 
programs. The introduction of microfinance to this volatile 
environment threatened the political power of the ruling 
parties, as the patrons no longer retained monopoly over the 
clientelist goods, which were, in this case, financial services 
offered to the poor.  
 The resultant competition between MFIs and the 
government challenged not only the political actors’ 
influence at the state-level, but also their international clout. 
The World Bank’s targeted elevation of Andhra Pradesh as 
the poster child of reform and development increased the 
importance placed on the state government’s reputation. That 
MFIs were able to undermine the operations of the 
government fueled the animosity between private MFIs and 
the state government. Thus, the state interfered in a manner 
consistent with its history of state-led development and 
heavy regulations, and pursued harsh actions that essentially 
shut down the industry.  
The dynamics of the political system in Andhra 
Pradesh thus cumulatively presented not only a unique 
environment that precipitated the microfinance crisis, but 
also the conditions necessary to ultimately design an 
appropriate regulatory mechanism. Following the crash, the 
international reputation of Andhra Pradesh rapidly 
deteriorated as scholars questioned the aptness of the state 
government’s actions toward MFIs. If the government wishes 
to maintain its political clout, it will likely pursue actions that 
reinforce the culpability of the MFIs and its own image as an 
apolitical regulator. Thus, it is likely that the government will 
adhere to the advice of the international community and 
construct regulatory mechanisms that, to a certain extent, 
increase the transparency of MFI operations, improve their 
integration with the financial sector, and display a certain 
level of forgiveness. Indeed, the Microfinance Institutions 
(Development and Regulation) Bill was introduced at the 
national level in March 2012. If passed, this bill will override 
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the Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Ordinance of 2010, 
establish the Reserve Bank of India as the centralized 
regulator of MFI operations, and financially rescue some of 
the MFIs, including SKS, which suffered after the Andhra 
Pradesh crisis.153 154 Because the national government is not 
hindered by the political undercurrents in Andhra Pradesh, it 
is likely that this bill will, in some form, be signed into law.  
Therefore, while the microfinance crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh certainly alarmed the international community, the 
fact that the events were primarily triggered by political 
rather than economic factors does not support the blanket 
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